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DUHIG TO DATE: PROBLEMS IN THE CONVEYANCING
OF FRACTIONAL MINERAL INTERESTS
by
Will G. Barber*
P robably not a day passes without a Texas attorney drafting a
deed or lease for execution by the owner of a fractional mineral
interest. Hardly a year passes in Texas without one or more of these
transactions causing litigation to determine the quantum of mineral
interest which passes to the grantee or lessee.1 Potential in each trans-
action are two litigious problems. One is that the language used may
create an uncertainty, conflict, or ambiguity as to the quantum of
mineral interest which the instrument purports to convey or lease.
The other is that the fractional mineral interest owned by the gran-
tor or lessor may be insufficient to satisfy both the fractional mineral
interest which the deed or lease purports to convey or lease and that
which it purports to reserve. For convenience the first problem will
be referred to as the "which fraction" problem, the second as the
"insufficient fraction" problem.!
The foremost case in this area of oil and gas law is Duhig v. Peavy-
Moore Lumber Co.,3 which has generated considerable controversy
among the members of the bench and the bar. Illustrative of the
divergent views regarding the Duhig case are the three opinions of
the Texas Supreme Court in McMahon v. Christmann." The recent
case of Miles v. Martin' evidences continuing judicial discomfort, if
not dissatisfaction, with results reached in certain instances under
the rule in the Duhig case.
The primary purpose of this Article is to synthesize in outline
form the Texas cases which have sought to solve the "which frac-
tion" and "insufficient fraction" problems in deeds and leases from
owners of a fractional mineral interest.!
*A.B., University of Texas; LL.B., Harvard University; Attorney at Law, Austin, Texas.
This Article pertains to both royalty and mineral interests. Regarding the distinction
between the two interests and its importance in drafting legal instruments, see generally
3-A Summers, Oil and Gas § 599 (perm. ed. 1958); Maxwell, The Mineral-Royalty Dis-
tinction and the Expense of Production, 33 Texas L. Rev. 463 (1955); Stanton, Recent
Developments in the Construction of Mineral and Royalty Grants and Reservations, South-
western Legal Foundation Seventh Annual Inst. on Oil & Gas L. & Tax. 301 (1956); Dis-
cussion Notes, 8 Oil & Gas Rep. 340 (1958); 7 Oil & Gas Rep. 330 (1957); 3 Oil &
Gas Rep. 480 (1954); 1 Oil & Gas Rep. 509 (1952).
Compare the "double fraction" terminology in Masterson, Double Fraction Problems
in Instruments Involving Mineral Interests, 11 Sw. L.J. 281 (1957).
'135 Tex. 503, 144 S.W.2d 878 (1940).
4 - Tex. -, 303 S.W.2d 341, 304 S.W.2d 267 (1957), 7 Oil & Gas Rep. 610.
- Tex. -, 321 S.W.2d 62 (1959).




A. Posing The "Which Fraction" Problem
Posed in question form, the "which fraction" problem is: Does the
disputed deed purport to convey a designated fraction of (a) the
entire mineral interest in certain land, or (b) the grantor's fractional
mineral interest in that land.! To illustrate:
Example: 0 owns an undivided V of the entire mineral interest in
Blackacre. A deed from 0 to A designates "V2" as the fraction to be
conveyed. "Which Fraction" Problem: Does the designated fraction
purport to convey (a) /2 of the entire mineral interest, or (b) /2 of
O's Y2 mineral interest?
This example exemplifies the type of dispute which may arise as to
the proper basis for computing a fraction designated in a deed. The
fractional difference when expressed mathematically may often seem
slight, but when translated into monetary terms it can be quite
significant.
B. Solving The "Which Fraction" Problem
The general principles stated by the courts in resolving the "which
fraction" problems and the application of these principles will be
discussed below.
1. General Principle: Intention of the Parties
In determining the quantum of mineral interest which a deed
purports to convey, the controlling issue is, of course, the intention
of the parties. That intention is to be ascertained from the entire
instrument, construed according to established rules for the interpre-
tation and construction of deeds.' One of these rules is especially im-
portant. If the deed is classified as "unambiguous," the court will de-
termine the intention of the parties solely from the language of the
deed, in the absence of fraud, accident, or mistake; 1' if, however, the
'Other similar statements of the problem are found in Masterson, supra note 2, at 281;
Masterson, A 1952 Survey of Basic Oil and Gas Law, 6 Sw. L.J. 1, 30 (1952); Case Note,
25 Texas L. Rev. 100 (1947); Discussion Notes, 5 Oil & Gas Rep. 1253 (1956); 1 Oil &
Gas Rep. 965, 1878 (1952); Annot., 163 A.L.R. 132 (1946).
'Harris v. Windsor, 156 Tex 324, 294 S.W.2d 798 (1956), 6 Oil & Gas Rep. 1234;
Woods v. Sims, 154 Tex. 59, 273 S.W.2d 617 (1954), 4 Oil & Gas Rep. 193; Benge v.
Scharbauer, 152 Tex. 447, 259 S.W.2d 166 (1953), 2 Oil & Gas Rep. 1350. See also 31-A
Tex. Jur., Oil and Gas § 40 (1947).
' Authorities cited note 8 supra. See also 14-B Tex. Jur., Deeds §§ 124-50 (1956).
"'American Republics Corp. v. Houston Oil Co., 173 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1949);
Benge v. Scharbauer, 152 Tex. 447, 259 S.W.2d 166 (1953); Young, Parol Evidence and
Texas Deeds: Some Current Problems, 34 Texas L. Rev. 351 (1956); Discussion Notes, 1
Oil & Gas Rep. 154 (1952); 31-A Tex. Jur., Oil and Gas § 41 (1947).
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deed is classified as "ambiguous," the court will admit and consider
certain extrinsic evidence for the purpose of construing, but not
varying, the terms of the instrument."
2. The "Described" Rule versus The "Conveyed" Rule
In applying the above general principle, the courts have distin-
guished between language referring to land described in the deed and
language referring to land conveyed by the deed.
a. The rDescribed" Rule.-Where a fraction designated in a deed
is stated to be a mineral interest in land described in the deed, the
fraction is to be calculated upon the entire mineral interest.
(1) Cases involving a granting clause.-In Clemmens v. Ken-
nedy" a granting clause which purported to convey an undivided 2
mineral interest in the "following described land" was held to convey
1/2 of the entire mineral interest and not 2 of the grantor's 2
mineral interest. In Spell v. Hanes" a granting clause which pur-
ported to convey an undivided 4 mineral interest in the "following
described lands" was given the same effect, notwithstanding a sub-
sequent provision that the "above grant is to apply to our [grantors']
undivided interest in and to above described land." In accord with
these holdings is Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Harrison," in which the
supreme court concluded that a clause providing that "one-half (2)
of the money rentals [delay rentals], which may be paid, on the
above described land . . . is to be paid to said Grantee" means Y2 of
the entire rentals and not V2 of the grantor's fractional interest
therein."
" Fantham v. Goodrich, 150 Tex. 601, 244 S.W.2d 519 (1952), 1 Oil & Gas Rep. 153;
Discussion Notes, 1 Oil & Gas Rep. 153 (1952); 31-A Tex. Jur., Oil and Gas § 41 (1947).
See also Young, supra note 10, at 352. For a statement of the test for determining whether
an instrument is "ambiguous," see McMahon v. Christmann, - Tex. -, 303 S.W.2d 341
(1957), 7 Oil & Gas Rep. 610. But cf. Neece v. A.A.A. Realty Co., - Tex. -, 332
S.W.2d 597 (1959). To be distinguished is the rule regarding when a deed and separate
instruments may be construed together as one transaction and agreement. See Miles v.
Martin, - Tex. -, 321 S.W.2d 62 (1959); 31-A Tex. Jur., Oil & Gas § 42 (1947).
"268 S.W.2d 321 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) error ref. "On all fours" with the Clemmens
case is King v. Cron, 285 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) error ref. n.r.e., 5 Oil &
Gas Rep. 1250 (1956).
's 139 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) error dism. judgm. cor.
14146 Tex. 216, 205 S.W.2d 355 (1947).
15Also in accord with the cited holdings is Sims v. Woods, 267 S.W.2d 571 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1954), 3 Oil & Gas Rep. 1528, aff'd, 154 Tex. 59, 273 S.W.2d 617 (1954), 4 Oil
& Gas Rep. 193. There a deed purported to convey an undivided 25/200 mineral interest in
land described by metes and bounds, and an intention clause defined the quantum to be
conveyed as an undivided twenty-five acre mineral interest in the "above described lands."
The land actually contained 226.88 acres. The court of civil appeals held that the deed
conveyed an undivided 25/226.88 (rather than 25/200) mineral interest; there was no
appeal from this part of its judgment.
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(2) Cases involving a reservation clause.-In McElmurray v.
McElmurray' the granting clause purported to convey all of the
grantor's undivided interest in "land described here below," and a
prior clause purported to reserve an undivided /2 mineral interest
in "the land herein described" (also referred to as "the following
described land"). The court held that the deed reserved to the gran-
tor an undivided /2 of the entire mineral interest. To the same effect
is the earlier case of King v. First Nat'l Bank.1 ' In the King case, a
clause reserving an undivided 8 of the usual '/8 royalty interest in
the "hereinabove described land" was construed to reserve i8 of the
entire royalty interest in the land described, even though the grant-
ing clause purported to convey only the grantor's undivided '2
mineral interest in the described land.1
b. The "Conveyed" Rule.-Where a fraction designated in a res-
ervation clause is stated to be a mineral interest in land conveyed by
the deed, the fraction is to be calculated upon the grantor's frac-
tional mineral interest except where the granting clause purports to
convey the entire mineral interest.
(1) Cases where the granting clause purports to convey the
grantor's fractional mineral interest.-In Hooks v. Neill" the deed
purported to convey all of the grantor's undivided 2 interest in
described property and to reserve 1/32 of all oil in "the said land
and premises herein described and conveyed." Relying upon the word
"conveyed," the court concluded that the clause reserved 1/32 of
the grantor's undivided 2 oil interest rather than 1/32 of the en-
tire oil interest. Following the Hooks case is Dowda v. Hayman,"
where the issue of "which fraction" was reserved in the deed turned
upon the word "conveyed."2
(2) Cases where the granting clause purports to convey the
entire mineral interest.-The writer knows of no Texas case in which
a deed from the owner of a fractional mineral interest purported to
convey the entire mineral interest and to reserve a fraction of the
"land conveyed." If the fraction designated in such a reservation
1"270 S.W.2d 880 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) error ref., 3 Oil & Gas Rep. 2108.
17 144 Tex. 583, 192 S.W.2d 260 (1946), 163 A.L.R. 1128.
"In Whitaker v. Neal, 187 S.W.2d 147 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) error ref., the court did
not reach the "which fraction" problem presented.
1 21 S.W.2d 532 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929) error ref.
20221 S.W.2d 1016 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) error ref.
21 Compare an analogous "which fraction" dispute which arose in McBride v. Hutson,
- Tex. -, 306 S.W.2d 888 (1957), 8 Oil & Gas Rep. 416, where a granting clause pur-
ported to convey an undivided Y3 interest in the "mineral estate which may be recov-
ered" in a suit by grantor-lessor against lessee. The court held that the quantum conveyed
was V3 of lessee's V/ working interest rather than Y3 of the entire mineral interest.
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clause were greater than the fraction outstanding in others, then the
"which fraction" problem could be very important." To illustrate:
Example: 0 owns an undivided 4 mineral interest in Blackacre. A
deed from 0 to A purports to convey the entire mineral interest in
Blackacre and to reserve a 2 mineral interest in the "land herein
conveyed."
In the above example the fraction reserved could be computed
upon either (a) O's 34 mineral interest which actually would be
conveyed by the deed but for the reservation clause, or (b) the en-
tire mineral interest which the granting clause purports to convey."
If the former is the proper basis, then the deed purports to convey
an undivided Y mineral interest (i.e., the entire mineral interest less
2 of O's 34 mineral interest). If the latter is the proper basis, then
the deed purports to convey an undivided 2 mineral interest. It is
submitted that the latter is the proper basis.
(3) Summary.-In the Hooks and Dowda cases the mineral in-
terest which the granting clause purported to convey and the mineral
interest which would have been conveyed but for the reservation
clause were exactly the same. In both cases it was soundly concluded
that by using the word "conveyed" in the reservation clause the
parties manifested an intention that the reserved fraction be com-
puted on the basis of the grantor's fractional mineral interest which
was being conveyed. But in the above hypothetical example, the
mineral interest which the granting clause purports to convey is
greater than the mineral interest which would be conveyed but for
the reservation clause. The writer submits that the preferable rule of
construction would be that the parties intended to reserve a fraction
of the mineral interest which the granting clause purports to convey.4
c. Appraisal of the "Described" Rule versus the "Conveyed"
Rule.-The rules of construction discussed above are well settled in
Texas. Since many instruments doubtlessly have been drafted in re-
liance on the decisions cited above, it is highly improbable that the
22 If the fraction designated in such a reservation clause were equal to or less than the
fraction outstanding in others, then all of the grantor's fractional mineral interest would
pass to the grantee under the rule in the Duhig case, discussed in text pp. 330-38 infra.
2" Determining the quantum of mineral interest which a deed purports to convey is a
prerequisite to determining whether to apply the rule in the Duhig case, discussed in text
pp. 330-38 infra.
24 There is language in the Dowda case which seems to stress the interest that the grant-
ing clause purports to convey: "[T]he deed . . . showed on its face both that it purported
to convey less than the entire interest in the land, and that the mineral interest reserved
was one-half of the interest in the land being conveyed by such deed." 221 S.W.2d at 1018.
Similar language can be found in the Hooks case. 21 S.W.2d at 538.
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supreme court would ever overturn these rules. Furthermore, subject
to the qualification expressed in the immediately preceding para-
graph, these rules of construction seem to effect the probable in-
tention of the parties."5
3. The "°Reference to a Prior Deed" Rule
A more subtle form of the "which fraction" problem arises where
a deed from the owner of a fractional mineral interest refers to a
prior deed in the grantor's chain of title which conveyed only a frac-
tional mineral interest." The reference usually follows the description
clause and often takes the form: "And being the same land des-
cribed in deed from [the grantor's predecessor] to [the grantor]."
The potential issue is whether the reference to the prior deed is (a) to
the physical land described in the prior deed only for the purpose of
description in the present deed, or (b) to a fractional mineral interest
designated in the prior deed for the purpose of limiting the pur-
ported conveyance in the present deed.
a. Reference "For All Purposes."-Where a reference to a prior
deed is stated to be "for all purposes," the reference operates to limit
the fractional interest which the deed otherwise purports to convey.
In Harris v. Windsor"7 a deed from Windsor, who owned an un-
divided 2 mineral interest, purported to convey a tract of land de-
scribed by metes and bounds. Following the description was: "And
being the same land described in Warranty deed from [Windsor's
grantor] . . .reference to which is made for all purposes." The deed
next reserved an undivided 8 mineral interest in the "above de-
25 For other discussion and criticism see authorities cited note 7 supra; Discussion Notes,
3 Oil & Gas Rep. 2111 (1954); Niblack, Cryptesthesia, 20 Tex. B.J. 115 (1957). Pub-
lished too late for inclusion in the text of this Article was the case of Clack v. Garcia, 323
S.W.2d 468 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959). This case seems to present a companion rule of con-
struction to the "described" and "conveyed" rules discussed in the text. This rule is that
where the fraction designated in a deed is stated to be a mineral interest in the grantor's
interest in the land described in the deed, the fraction is to be calculated upon the grantor's
fractional mineral interest in that land. In the Clack case a deed from the owner of an
undivided 1/16 mineral interest purported to reserve as a non-participating royalty "an
undivided one-sixteenth (1/16th) interest (same being one-half of the usual one-eighth
royalty) in and to all of the oil, gas and other minerals in, to, under and that may be
produced from the interest of said grantors in said land .... " The court held that since
the deed reserved a royalty described as 1/16 of the grantors' interest, it reserved a 1/256
royalty interest.
" An analogous problem arises where a deed from the owner of a fractional mineral
interest refers to an existing lease. For a comprehensive discussion of this problem see Elliott,
The Fractional Mineral Deed "Subject To" a Lease, 36 Texas L. Rev. 620 (1958). See
also Williams, Hoffman v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.: The "Subject To" Clause in Mineral
and Royalty Deeds, 30 Texas L. Rev. 395 (1952); Meyers & Williams, Hoffman v. Mag-
nolia Petroleum Co.: A Further Comment, 35 Texas L. Rev. 363 (1957); Stanton, supra
note 1; 3-A Summers, Oil & Gas § 606 (perm. ed. 1958).
" 156 Tex. 324, 294 S.W.2d 798 (1956), 6 Oil & Gas Rep. 1234.
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scribed premises." The court concluded that the "reference to which
is made for all purposes" clause was not for the sole purpose of de-
scription, but was also for the purpose of disclosing that Windsor's
deed was subject to all restrictions and reservations in the prior
deed. Hence, Windsor's deed was held to convey an undivided
/8 mineral interest (i.e., Windsor's 2 mineral interest less the 8
mineral interest reserved) rather than an undivided Y8 mineral in-
terest (i.e., the entire mineral interest less the 8 mineral interest
reserved). Cited as authority was Remuda Oil Co. v. Wilson, 8 in
which a royalty deed from the owner of an undivided 1/16 royalty
interest purported to convey an undivided Y interest in all royalties
from Blackacre, and adding " . . . and being the same land described
in that certain deed [from grantor to X] ...reference to which is
here made for all purposes." The court in the Wilson case construed
the reference clause as requiring the grantees to look to the prior
deed to determine the extent of their purchase.
b. Insufficient Description of Land.-Where a deed does not con-
tain a legally sufficient description of the land involved, reference
to a prior deed operates to incorporate the description of the land
contained in the prior deed but does not limit the fractional mineral
interest which the deed otherwise purports to convey.
Supporting the above rule is Sharp v. Fowler.' In that case a deed
from X to 0 conveyed the surface of Blackacre, reserving the entire
mineral interest. Thereafter, 0 acquired an undivided /4 of the
mineral interest in Blackacre. 0 then executed a deed which pur-
ported to convey Blackacre described as: "50 acres of land situated
in Panola County, Texas, and being 20.3 acres of the [Y survey]
• . . and 29.7 acres of the [Z survey] . .. and being the same land
described in [deed from X to 0]. .. " The court concluded that
the reference to the prior deed was merely to describe the boundaries
of the land conveyed by O's deed and that it did not operate to
exclude O's undivided 4 mineral interest.
c. Sufficient Description of Land.-Where a deed does contain a
legally sufficient description of the land involved, conflicting results
have been reached.
In the Duhig case, the granting clause of a deed from the owner
of an undivided V2 mineral interest purported to convey Blackacre,
described by metes and bounds, after which was added "and being
8264 S.W.2d 192 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) error ref. n.r.e., 3 Oil & Gas Rep. 842.
29151 Tex. 490, 252 S.W.2d 153 (1952), 1 Oil & Gas Rep. 1835.
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the same tract of land formerly owned by [grantor's predecessor]
• ..and conveyed [to grantor by his predecessor]. . . ." The court
ruled that this reference was not intended to define or qualify the
estate or interest conveyed but that it was inserted to identify fur-
ther the tract described by metes and bounds. However, a,contrary
result was reached in Winters v. Slover. ° There, the granting clause
of a deed of trust from the owner of an undivided V2 mineral in-
terest contained a specific description of Blackacre and referred to it
as being the "same land conveyed by [the trustor's predecessor] to
[the trustor]. . . ." The court decided that as a method of excepting
'/2 of the entire mineral interest from the deed of trust, the parties
had chosen to refer to the prior deed which had excepted this
amount.
d. Appraisal of The "Reference to a Prior Deed" Rule.-Absent
language explicitly indicating otherwise, a reference in a mineral deed
to a prior deed would seem to have been intended by the draftsman
for the purpose of description and perhaps also for the assistance it
might lend some future title examiner. Accordingly, unless a "for all
purposes" phrase or its equivalent is included, the reference should
not be construed as words of limitation or reservation. This seems to
be the better rule of construction, even where the deed contains a
legally sufficient description.31
4. The "Of" Rule versus The "Out Of" Rule
This precept of construction can best be expressed by contrasting
the following examples of granting clauses:
a. The "of" type which purports to convey a "1/16 of the gran-
tor's /4 mineral interest in Blackacre."
b. The tout of" type which purports to convey a "1/16 mineral
interest out of the grantor's 4 mineral interest in Blackacre."
c. The "hybrid" type which purports to convey a "1/16 mineral
interest of the grantor's mineral interest in Blackacre."
The "of" example indisputably purports to convey an undivided
1/64 of the entire mineral interest in Blackacre. In that example
the word "of" means "times"; it is a word symbol for the mathe-
matical symbol of multiplication. The quantum conveyed by such
a granting clause can only be the product of multiplying the frac-
30 151 Tex. 485, 251 S.W.2d 726 (1952), 1 Oil & Gas Rep. 1873.
" For other discussions see Masterson, supra note 2; Stanton, supra note 1; Discussion
Notes, 6 Oil & Gas Rep. 1237 (1956), 3 Oil & Gas Rep. 850 (1954), 1 Oil & Gas Rep.
965, 1838, 1878 (1952).
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tion preceding the word "of" by the quantum of mineral interest
following that word.'
The "out of" example, although not entirely free from uncer-
tainty, probably should be construed to convey an undivided 1/16
of the entire mineral interest in Blackacre. The words "out of" in
context mean "from"; they designate the source from which some-
thing is to be taken. Nevertheless, there remains the determination
of the quantum of mineral interest to be taken. Hence, the real in-
quiry in construing the "out of" example is: Do the words "1/16
mineral interest," standing alone, connote a designated fraction of
the entire mineral interest? Probably they do. So construed, the "out
of" phrase serves only the function of naming the source from which
to carve the designated quantum.
The "hybrid" example is the perplexing one. It unites the con-
trolling characteristics of the other two examples. The writer submits
that it is ambiguous and therefore explainable by extrinsic evidence;
further, in the absence of such evidence, the preferable meaning is
a purported conveyance of 1/16 of the entire mineral interest in
Blackacre rather than 1/16 of the grantor's mineral interest.
The only Texas case known to the writer construing the "out of"
and "hybrid" type granting clauses is Minchen v. Hirsch." One of
the deeds litigated in that case contained the following clauses:
(1) a granting clause which purported to convey "a one-sixteenth
(1/16th) fee mineral royalty of [grantor's] ... one-fourth (1/4th)
interest in, on, or under the following described land. .. ."
(2) an habendum clause which referred to "the above described one-
sixteenth (1/16th) fee perpetual mineral royalty in, on, or under
[grantor's] . . .undivided one-fourth (1/4th) interest .... "
(3) a subsequent clause which declared it to be the grantor's inten-
tion to convey "a perpetual one-sixteenth (1/16th) fee mineral royalty
out of [grantor's] . . . interest therein."
The trial court decreed that the deed conveyed an undivided 1/64
royalty interest. The court of civil appeals reversed and rendered
judgment, holding that it conveyed an undivided 1/16 royalty in-
terest. This judgment was given an "n.r.e." sanction by the supreme
court.
"'In Minchen v. Hirsch, 295 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) error ref. n.r.e., 6
Oil & Gas Rep. 1364, a correction deed of trust stated that the mineral interest conveyed
was an "undivided one-half (Y2) of the [grantor's] holdings of one-fourth (') in [Black-
acre]." That part of the court's judgment holding that the deed of trust conveyed an un-
divided one-eighth (i) mineral interest in Blackacre was not appealed. See also Discussion




The grantor conceded that the granting clause, taken alone, would
grant an undivided 1/64 royalty interest. The court of civil ap-
peals, discarding the habendum clause as ambiguous, concluded that
the clear meaning of the intention clause was that the grantor con-
veyed an undivided 1/16 royalty interest in Blackacre. This conces-
sion by the grantor and construction by the court brought the
granting and intention clauses into irreconcilable conflict. The court
determined that the intention clause should prevail, stressing its
intentional and holographic attributes. 4
Application of the writer's analysis of the above examples to the
Minchen case would result in the same judgment being entered;
however, the result would be reached by the process of classifying
both the granting and habendum clauses as ambiguous and reconcil-
ing them with the intention clause.
C. Posing The "Insufficient Fraction" Problem
Stated in question form, the "insufficient fraction" problem is:
Where the fractional mineral interest which a grantor owns is in-
sufficient to satisfy both the fractional mineral interest which his
warranty deed purports to convey and the one which it purports
to exclude,"5 what quantum of mineral interest passes to the grantee?
To illustrate:
Example: 0 owns an undivided /2 mineral interest in Blackacre. A
warranty deed from 0 to A purports to convey to A an undivided 2
of the entire mineral interest in Blackacre and to retain in 0 an un-
divided 2 of the entire mineral interest. "Insufficient Fraction" Prob-
lem: What quantum of mineral interest passed to A?
Under these circumstances, the court must either (a) apply O's
fractional mineral interest first to satisfy the fractional mineral
interest which the deed purports to convey to A, retaining in 0
only the excess, if any, or (b) apply O's fractional mineral interest
first to satisfy the fractional mineral interest which the deed pur-
ports to retain in 0, conveying to A only the excess, if any.
D. Solving The "Insufficient Fraction" Problem
The courts have chosen to resolve the "insufficient fraction" prob-
lem in favor of the grantee by applying the grantor's fractional
" The word "out" had been interlined by handwriting in a printed mineral deed form.
as Disputes depending upon the distinction between exclusions by reservation and by
exception have been largely allayed by the rule in the Duhig case, discussed in text pp. 330-38
infra. Regarding this distinction, see Pich v. Lankford, - Tex. -, 302 S.W.2d 645 (1957),
7 Oil & Gas Rep. 628; Klein v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 126 Tex. 450, 86 S.W.2d 1077(193S).
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mineral interest first to satisfy the fractional mineral interest which
the warranty deed purports to convey. This choice, couched in
terms of estoppel, was first announced by the Texas Suprreme Court
in the Duhig case, and is based upon equitable principles. Thus it is
frequently referred to as the rule in the Duhig case, or simply the
Duhig rule.
1. Statement of The Rule in the Duhig Case
The Duhig case holds that where a warranty deed purports to
convey a fractional mineral interest, the grantor will be estopped
to assert title in the retained fractional mineral interest to the ex-
tent that this assertion would conflict with the grantee's title to
the fractional mineral interest purportedly conveyed."
Applying that holding to the facts in the Duhig case (stated in
the above example), the grantor was estopped to assert any title
in the retained '2 mineral interest since any such assertion would
conflict with the V2 mineral interest which the deed purported to
convey to the grantee. Applying the Duhig holding to varying fact
situations results in using whatever fractional mineral interest the
grantor owns to satisfy first the fractional mineral interest which
the deed purports to convey, retaining in the grantor only the ex-
cess, if any.
2. Reason for The Rule in the Duhig Case
The rule in the Duhig case was designed to accord the grantee a
more equitable redress for breach of warranty than a suit for dam-
ages. An immediate breach of warranty arises whenever the fractional
mineral interest owned by a grantor when he executes a warranty
deed is less than the fractional mineral interest which his deed pur-
ports to convey and to retain. Under these circumstances, should
the grantor be permitted to assert title to the retained fractional
mineral interest and to compel the grantee to seek compensation
for this loss by a suit for monetary damages for breach of warranty?
In answering this question in the negative, the court reasoned by
analogy to the equitable rule of after-acquired title, which estops
the grantor of a warranty deed from asserting against his grantee
any after-acquired title in the estate which the deed purports to
3 For various statements of the holding in the Duhig case, see Miles v. Martin, -
Tex. -, 321 S.W.2d 62 (1959); McMahon v. Christmann, - Tex. -, 303 S.W.2d 341
(1957), 7 Oil & Gas Rep. 610; Gibson v. Turner, 156 Tex. 289, 294 S.W.2d 781 (1956),
6 Oil & Gas Rep. 1212; Benge v. Scharbauer, 152 Tex. 447, 259 S.W.2d 166 (1953), 2
Oil & Gas Rep. 1350; Masterson, supra note 2, at 287; Stanton, supra note 1, at 332;
Maxwell, supra note 1, at 464; Case Note, 25 Texas L. Rev. 100 (1946).
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convey. The reason supporting the rule of after-acquired title, as
stated by the court, is:
When one assumes, by his deed, to convey a title, and by any form
of assurance obligates himself to protect the grantee in the enjoyment
of that which the deed purports to give him, he will not be suffered
afterwards to acquire or assert a title, and turn his grantee over, to a
suit upon his covenants for redress. The short and effectual method of
redress is to deny him the liberty of setting up his after-acquired title
as against his previous conveyance. This is merely refusing him the
countenance and assistance of the courts in breaking the assurance
which his covenants had given."s
The court in the Duhig case concluded that if estoppel to assert
title in contradiction or breach of warranty is a fair and effectual
remedy in the instance of "after-acquired title," it is also fair, effec-
tual, and appropriate in the case of "retained title."
3. Appraisal of The Rule in the Duhig Case
As applied to deed transactions, the rule in the Duhig case, wheth-
er sound or not, is beyond the judicial point of no return. The
majority opinion in McMahon v. Christmann8 noted that: "The
rule [in the Duhig case] having become an established one in the
construction of deeds we have no occasion, in this case or at this
late hour, to question its validity when it is so used."' " Furthermore,
the statement and application of the Duhig rule seems sound."' The
basic problem is to determine which party should bear the loss of
title where the grantor's ownership is inadequate to meet both the
claims of conveyed title and retained title." This title problem is
of utmost importance due to the nature of oil property, particularly
after production, since the remedy afforded by damages for breach
of warranty is often nugatory. The reasoning of the court has con-
vinced the writer that the more equitable result is to impose loss
of title on the grantor, unless' the deed expressly provides otherwise.
4. Application of The Rule in the Duhig Case
The rule in the Duhig case was applied without modification or
amplification in Fleming v. Miller,"2 Howell v. Liles" (a case of
17 135 Tex. 503, 508, 144 S.W.2d 878, 880 (1940).
s Tex. -, 303 S.W.2d 341 (1957), 7 Oil & Gas Rep. 610.
" Id. at 346. But cf. dissenting opinion, - Tex. -, 304 S.W.2d 267 (1957).
40 Express judicial approval of the soundness of the rule in the Duhig case may be found
in the McMahon case, 303 S.W.2d at 346, 348. But see dissenting opinion, 304 S.W.2d at
268. S1See Discussion Notes, 2 Oil & Gas Rep. 1359 (1953), 1 Oil & Gas Rep. 509 (1952).
42228 S.W.2d 355 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950), rev'd on other grounds, 149 Tex. 368, 233
S.W.2d 571 (1950).
'3246 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951), 1 Oil & Gas Rep. 506.
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"after-acquired" title as well as "reserved" title), and Benge v.
Scharbauer" (as to the fractional mineral interest involved, as dis-
tinguished from the fractional royalty-rental interest).
5. Development of The Rule in the Duhig Case
As is customary with other legal rules, the Duhig rule has been
subjected to the processes of legal qualitative analysis-identifying
and defining its essential elements to determine its applicability or
inapplicability to various fact situations.
a. "Warranty" Element.-The deed in the Duhig case contained
a formal convenant of general warranty; the result in the Duhig
case flowed from an immediate breach of that warranty. This, of
course, prompted inquiry as to whether the Duhig rule applies to
any type of deed other than a general warranty deed. "
(1) Special warranty deed.-American Republics Corp. v.
Houston Oil Co." holds that a deed with a special warranty estops
a fractional mineral interest owner from making a claim of title which
would diminish his grantee's title in the same manner as a deed with
general warranty, citing the Duhig case as its authority.
(2) Implied warranty deed.-Although the writer knows of
no Texas case squarely in point, article 12974' and cases involving
express warranty deeds point to the proposition that the Duhig rule
applies to any deed which purports to grant or convey (as dis-
tinguished from quitclaim) a definite quantum of mineral interest.
Article 1297 provides that the use of the word "grant" or "con-
vey" raises an implied covenant (a) that previous to the time of
execution of the conveyance the grantor has not conveyed the same
interest to any person other than the grantee, and (b) that such estate
is at the time of the execution of the conveyance free from in-
cumbrances. It further provides that such implied convenants may
be sued upon in the same manner as iA they had been expressly in-
serted in the conveyance. Thus, article 1297 ascribes the incidents
of a special warranty deed to a deed which purports to "convey"
or "grant" a definite fractional mineral interest. It would seem to
follow that the rule in the Duhig case applies to such a deed where
44152 Tex. 447, 259 S.W.2d 166 (1953), 2 Oil & Gas Rep. 1350.
4' The rule in the Duhig case obviously does not apply to quitclaim deeds. Discussion
Notes, 2 Oil & Gas Rep. 1359 (1953). Nor does the rule of after-acquired title apply to
quitclaim deeds. Halbert v. Green, 156 Tex. 223, 293 S.W.2d 848 (1956), 6 Oil & Gas
Rep. 1056.
" 173 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1949). See also Dean v. Hidalgo County Water Improvement
Dist. No. Two, 320 S.W.2d 29 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) error ref. n.r.e.
"Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 1297 (1945).
[Vol. 13
FRACTIONAL MINERAL INTERESTS
the grantor had previously conveyed a fractional mineral interest.'
The following case involving express warranty instruments con-
tain language indicating that the controlling feature is a representa-
tion in the deed, express or implied, that the grantor owns the frac-
tional mineral interest purportedly conveyed.' In American Re-
publics Corp. v. Houston Oil Co. the court stated:
. .. [W]here the grant is based on an affirmation of ownership and is
a conveyance of title as opposed to a chance of title, there is an effectual
estoppel at once raised to assert title in dimunition of the grant,
whether the covenant of warranty is general or special, or, indeed there
is no covenant of warranty at all.
In Duhig's case, as here, what is important and controlling is not
whether grantor actually owned the title to the land it conveyed, but
whether, in the deed, it asserted that it did, and undertook to convey it."0
In Clark v. Gauntt,5 a case concerned with after-acquired title
to a fractional mineral interest, the court stated:
The estoppel in the after-acquired title cases arises from the assertion
of ownership made by the grantor in the covenant of warranty, express
or implied, or in other recitals in the deed. Such assertion is a representa-
tion that the grantor owns the land or the estate or interest to which
it relates, and having thus represented the fact of ownership, the grantor
is estopped to deny that fact."'
b. "Quantum" Element.-If a warranty deed purports to convey
only an indefinite quantum of mineral interest (e.g., 2 of the
grantor's right, title, and interest in Blackacre), the Duhig rule
does not apply. This follows from the rationale of cases holding that
the rule of after-acquired title does not apply to warranty deeds
which purport to convey all the grantor's right, title, and interest
in Blackacre." Courts reason that such a deed purports to convey
only the interest which the grantor owns on the date of execution
and warrants title only to the interest purportedly conveyed.
4It is arguable that the word incumbrance in article 1297 embraces an outstanding
title which does not result from a prior conveyance by the grantor, and consequently the
Duhig rule applies to such a deed. In Morris v. Short, 151 S.W. 633 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912)
error ref., a case concerned with after-acquired title to the entire fee interest, it was held
that a paramount, outstanding title is an 'incumbrance" within the meaning of article 1297.
"'See also Benge v. Scharbauer, 152 Tex. 447, 259 S.W.2d 166 (1953), 2 Oil & Gas
Rep. 1350; Talley v. Howsley, 142 Tex. 81, 176 S.W.2d 158 (1944); Lindsay v. Freeman,
83 Tex. 259, 18 S.W. 727 (1892); Annot. 144 A.L.R. 554 (1943); Discussion Notes, 6
Oil & Gas Rep. 1230 (1956).
s0 173 F.2d 728, 734 (5th Cir. 1949).
" 138 Tex. 558, 161 S.W.2d 270 (1942).
52 1d. at 562, 161 S.W.2d at 272.
sSee Clark v. Gaunt, 138 Tex. 558, 161 S.W.2d 270 (1942); Roberts v. Corbett, 265
S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) error ref.
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If, however, such a deed contains a clause which warrants title
to a definite quantum of mineral interest (e.g., "in so far as the
grantor's warranty herein applies, it is estimated that the
interest hereby conveyed is equal to an undivided 9/224 of the
entire mineral interest in Blackacre"), the Duhig rule is applicable.
The two examples given above comprise the pertinent provisions
of a warranty deed from the owner of an undivided 9/160 mineral
interest in Fantham v. Goodrich." The court concluded that the
Duhig rule was controlling and that the deed effected a conveyance
to the grantee of an undivided 9/224 rather than 9/320 mineral
interest.
c. "Agreement of the Parties" Element.-The rule in the Duhig
case is based upon equitable principles and considerations.55 It is
elementary, then, that the rule should never be applied where doing
so would defeat the manifest intention of the parties. It should be
applied only where their intention cannot be fully carried out. It
follows that if the language of the deed indicates which party is to
bear any loss of title because of an insufficiency in the grantor's
ownership, that intention or agreement should be given affect. As-
sume, for example, that a fractional mineral deed contains the fol-
lowing provision:
It is the agreement and intention of the parties to this instrument
that if the grantor does not own mineral interest in the above described
land sufficient to satisfy both the mineral interest which this instrument
purports to convey to the grantee and the one which it purports to
reserve to the grantor, then whatever mineral interest is owned by the
grantor in the above described land shall be applied first to satisfy the
mineral interest which this instrument purports to reserve to the gran-
tor and only the excess, if any, shall pass to the grantee, notwithstand-
ing the grantor's warranty of title or representation of ownership here-
in.5
Would the rule in the Duhig case apply to such a deed? The
writer doubts that it would."' Such application would supplant,
instead of supplement, the evident intention of the parties.
54238 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951), 1 Oil & Gas Rep. 153, rev'd on other
grounds, 150 Tex. 601, 244 S.W.2d 510 (1952). See also Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Pan-
than, 268 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) error dism. w.o.j.
" See cases cited note 8 supra and accompanying text.
5 A clause covering after-acquired title perhaps could be inserted at this point.
"' There is language supporting this view in the dissenting opinion in Benge v. Schar-
bauer, 152 Tex. at 457, 259 S.W.2d at 171: "Moreover, in a given case, the deed might
be such as to show from its four corners beyond any doubt that even if the grantor's
ownership were less than represented in the deed, he was yet to have his stipulated interest
in the royalty unimpaired-an unlikely case, to be sure, but theoretically possible .... "
Cf. the following language in the majority opinion in McMahon v. Christmann, - Tex.
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(1) The Benge v. Scharbauer Case.'--The dominant reason-
ing the majority opinion in the Benge case seems to be in accord
with the above analysis. In this case a general warranty deed from
the owner of an undivided 4 mineral interest purported to convey
the entire mineral interest in Blackacre with a reservation to the
grantor of an undivided 3 mineral interest. It also gave the grantee
the sole power to execute all future mineral leases with the limitation
that "said leases shall provide for the payment of three-eighths
( 3/ths) of all the bonuses, rentals and royalties to the grantors."
Without pause or disagreement the court held that the Duhig
rule applied to the purported conveyance of mineral interest, with
the result being that the grantee acquired an undivided Y8 mineral
interest and the grantor retained but an undivided V8 mineral
interest. With hesitation and dissent the court held that the Duhig
rule did not apply to the interest in bonuses, rentals, and royalties
with the result being that the grantor was entitled to receive YS
of all bonuses, delay rentals, and royalties.
The majority construed the deed provision that all future leases
*shall provide for the payment of three-eighths (3Aths) of all the
bonuses, rentals and royalties to the grantors" as a contractual agree-
ment that the grantor shall receive such interest rather than his
proportionate share. The majority then declared that the Duhig rule
"should not be extended to change the express agreement as to what
interests the grantors shall receive in bonuses, rentals and royalties
under leases to be executed by the grantee."'" The court in effect
construed the quoted provision as manifesting an agreement that
regardless of what fractional mineral interest passed to the grantee
under the deed, the grantor's share of all future lease incidents
should nevertheless be 3/, the grantee receiving the excess, if any.60
(2) The McLain v. First Nat'l Bank Case."-The result reached
in McLain v. First Nat'l Bank seems defensible under the above
analysis but vulnerable under the court's approach. There, a deed
from the owner of an undivided 2 mineral interest purported to
convey the entire mineral interest and contained a reservation clause
-, 303 S.W.2d 341, 345 (1957), 7 Oil & Gas Rep. 610: "The effect of the holding [in
the Duhig case] was to take from the grantor the one-half of the minerals retained by
him, without reference to or regard for the intention of the parties, and give the same to
the grantee in order to fulfill the covenant of general warranty."
58 152 Tex. 447, 259 S.W.2d 166 (1953), 2 Oil & Gas Rep. 1350.
59Id. at 454, 259 S.W.2d at 169.
60For other explications of the Benge case, see Stanton, supra note 1, at 333; Case
Note, 32 Texas L. Rev. 471 (1954); Discussion Notes, 2 Oil & Gas Rep. 1359 (1953).6' 263 S.W.2d 324 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) error ref. n.r.e., 3 Oil & Gas Rep. 477.
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which provided: "There is reserved for the benefit of grantors a one-
fourth participating royalty; that is, one-fourth of everything includ-
ing bonuses and delayed rentals, and one-fourth of one-eighth of the
oil produced from the land described herein." At the trial the grantor
introduced extrinsic evidence showing that (a) the parties, believing
the grantor to be the owner of the entire mineral interest, executed
a contract of sale under which the grantee was to acquire an un-
divided 34 mineral interest and the grantor was to retain the other
4; (b) after discovering that an undivided 2 mineral interest
was outstanding, the parties agreed to complete the sale on the basis
that the grantee would get only an undivided Y4 mineral interest
and the grantor would retain the same quantum; and (c) the grantee
desired to have the deed remain as originally written since there was
some question as to the validity of the outstanding title. The
grantor's prayer for reformation of the deed in conformity with
the above agreement was granted by the trial court.
The trial court's judgment entitling tle grantor to a 4 participat-
ing royalty, including rentals and bonuses, was affirmed. The court's
affirmation was on the ground that the language of the deed, construed
under the dictates of the Benge case, effectively withheld the frac-
tional interest purportedly reserved. Extrinsic evidence and reforma-
tion seem not to have played an active role in the court's deliberation.
To that extent the court's reasoning is amiss. A simple reservation of
a designated royalty, rental, and bonus interest is not equivalent to
the contractual agreement in the Benge case that all future leases
shall provide for the payment of a specified interest to the grantor.
A reservation--of a mineral interest or of a royalty, rental, and bonus
interest-is subject to the disabling effect of the Duhig rule, absent
language evincing a contrary agreement or intention." The factor
in the McLain case which should have countervailed the Duhig rule
is not the royalty nature of the reservation, but rather the above
agreement of the parties, established by extrinsic evidence and in-
serted by reformation.
d. "Mutual Mistake" Element.-Analytically, this element may
more properly be discussed in conjunction with the "which frac-
tion" problem,"2 but is interposed here because of its overlap and
inter-relation with the Duhig rule. It concerns the rules and reme-
"2See Miles v. Martin, - Tex. -, 321 S.W.2d 62 (1959), where a reservation of Y4
of all royalty, bonus money, and delay rentals was held to fall squarely within the Duhig
rule. See also dissenting opinion in Gibson v. Turner, 156 Tex. 289, 294 S.W.2d 781, 792
(1956), 6 Oil & Gas Rep. 1212, which stated: "The Benge case does not say that the
Duhig rule applies only to reservations of mineral interests as distinguished from royalties."
62 See cases cited note 8 supra and accompanying text.
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dies, if any, which pertain where the parties to a deed are mutually
mistaken as to the legal effect of the deed's provisions. This quandary
was presented in Miles v. Martin,4 the supreme court's recent anato-
mization of the Duhig rule. In the Miles case, the grantor owned
an undivided 34 mineral interest in Blackacre; the deed purported
to convey the entire mineral interest with a reservation of 4 of
the royalty, bonus money, and delay rentals. The court concluded
that the deed was unambiguous and squarely within the operation of
the Duhig rule. That conclusion is undoubtedly correct.
As the court pointed out, however, the contract of sale, loan
application, deed of trust, and subsequent dealings of the parties
revealed that both the grantor and grantee intended that the deed
reserve a 4 mineral interest in addition to the /4 previously
reserved by the grantor's predecessor. The record thus reflected a
mutual mistake by the parties as to the legal effect of the deed pro-
visions. The court held that as against such a mutual mistake of
law, equity will grant relief to the grantor by way of reformation,
if the circumstances warrant the relief. The court also noted au-
thorities indicating that under such circumstances the grantee holds
the interest unintentionally conveyed in constructive trust for the
grantor."5
Although both modes of correcting the situation seem proper,
each is subject to exacting limitations. Reformation may be barred
by laches or limitations,6 while constructive trust rights may be
subjugated by the rights of a bona fide purchaser from the grantee.
e. "Knowledge" or "Notice" Element.-Somewhat akin to the
two preceding elements is a consideration of the effect, if any, of
a grantee's actual knowledge or constructive notice of the state of
title.' The inquiry here is whether the Duhig rule applies where
the grantee knows, or is charged with knowledge, that the grantor
does not own the quantum of mineral interest so represented in the
deed.
"Record notice" of the state of title is immaterial to application
of the Duhig rule. The grantee in the Duhig case had record notice
64 Tex. -, 321 S.W.2d 62 (1959).
6'See Biggs v. Poling, 134 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) error dism. judgm. cor.
66 The four-year statute of limitations governs and commences to run when the action-
able mistake was, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have been, discovered.
Miles v. Martin, - Tex. -, 321 S.W.2d 62 (1959).
6A distinct and separate element, not herein discussed, is whether the Duhig rule
applies where the grantee owns the balance of mineral interest not owned by the grantor.
Regarding this element see McMahon v. Christmann, - Tex. -, 303 S.W.2d 341 (1957),
7 Oil & Gas Rep. 610; Gibson v. Turner, 156 Tex. 289, 294 S.W.2d 781 (1956), 6 Oil
& Gas Rep. 1212.
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of the outstanding title. "Actual knowledge" of the state of title
is likewise immaterial. The Duhig rule was applied without comment
as to this point in both the Benge and Miles cases where the respec-
tive grantees had "actual knowledge."6 In Frels v. Schuette," the
court rejected the grantor's contention that there can be no estoppel
as to after-acquired title where the grantee has full knowledge of
all the facts and conditions of title. The court stated: "[T]he mat-
ter of notice, whether actual or constructive, had nothing to do
with the right of the [grantee] ...to recover for the breach of
the covenant of general warranty so contained in such deed."7
II. LEASE TRANSACTIONS
A. Posing The "Which Fraction" Problem
The "which fraction" problem emanating from a lease executed
by the owner of a fractional mineral interest analytically is the same
as in a deed transaction. In question form the problem is: Does the
disputed lease purport to reserve as royalty a designated fraction of
(a) the entire mineral interest in certain land, or (b) the grantor's
fractional mineral interest in that land?
The scope of the "which fraction" problem in lease transactions
has been considerably narrowed by a draftsman's technique-the
proportionate reduction clause. This clause operates where the lessor
owns less than the entire mineral interest in the land described;
if that is true, the proportionate reduction clause reduces the lessor's
royalty interest to the proportion which his fractional interest bears
to the entire mineral interest. Thus, in lease transactions, "which
fraction" disputes arise only in regard to interests reserved by the
lessor which are not covered by a proportionate reduction clause.
B. Solving The "Which Fraction" Problem
The "which fraction" problem in lease and deed transactions
being the same, the courts' solutions are the same. The general prin-
ciple of intention of the parties and the resulting rules of construc-
tion discussed above" apply equally to lease tranactions."
1. The "Described" Rule
The courts have distinguished between language referring to land
' See also dissenting opinion in Gibson v. Turner, supra note 62. But see Stanton, supra
note 1, at 334; Case Note, 32 Texas L. Rev. 471, 474 (1956).
6' 222 S.W.2d 1006 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) error ref. n.r.e.
70 Id. at 1009.
71 See pp. 321-29 supra.
7
1See McMahon v. Christmann, - Tex. -, 303 S.W.2d 341 (1957), 7 Oil & Gas Rep.
610; Gibson v. Turner, 156 Tex. 289, 294 S.W.2d 781 (1956), 6 Oil & Gas Rep. 1212.
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described in a lease and language referring to land leased by the in-
strument. Thus, where a fraction designated in a lease is stated to be
a reserved interest in oil produced from land described in the lease,
such fraction is to be calculated upon the entire production from
that land (unless reduced by operation of a proportionate reduction
clause).
a. Normal Royalty Reservation.-Lease forms usually contain
a royalty clause which reserves to the lessor 8 of all oil produced
from the land described in the lease (e.g., "from said land," "from
the above described land," etc.). Absent a proportionate reduction
clause, such leases obligate the lessee to pay as royalty 8 of all oil
produced from the tract of land described. This proposition is
established by the unique case of Gibson v. Turner."s
In the Gibson case, a lease executed by the owner of an undivided
9/40 mineral interest purported to lease the entire interest in "the
following described land." The royalty clause purported to reserve
IY of all oil produced "from said land." The proportionate reduction
clause had been deleted from the printed form by "x-ing" it out.
The court held that the lease purported to reserve as royalty 8 of
the entire production.
b. Additional Reservations.-Some leases reserve to the lessor an
interest in addition to his normal royalty interest, such as an over-
riding royalty or oil payment.
In Lacy, Inc. v. Jarrett," the owner of an undivided 7/12 mineral
interest purported to lease the entire mineral interest."' The lease
reserved an oil payment "out of one-eighth of seven-eighths of the
oil . . . produced . . . from said land under this lease." The court
directed that the oil payment be satisfied from 8 of 3/8 of the
oil produced rather than 8 of 7/12 of 8.
The lease in McMahon v. Christmann' reserved to the owner of
an undivided 1/6 mineral interest "without reduction, as an over-
riding royalty, a net 1/32nd of 8/8ths of all oil . . . produced . . .
from the above described premises. . .. ,"' Under the majority opinion
the words "without reduction" in the overriding royalty clause con-
flicted with and prevailed over the proportionate reduction clause.
73 156 Tex. 289, 294 S.W.2d 781 (1956), 7 Oil & Gas Rep. 610. The cases cited by
the court as controlling on this point are deed transaction cases discussed in text accompany-
ing and following note 12 supra.
74214 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) error ref.
" The grantor's normal royalty was subject to the proportionate reduction clause.
s - Tex. -, 303 S.W.2d 341 (1957), 7 Oil & Gas Rep. 610.
77 Id. at -, 303 S.W.2d at 343. All parties admitted that the grantor's normal royalty
was subject to the proportionate reduction clause.
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Accordingly, the majority held the overriding royalty to be 1/32
of the total production.
2. The "Reference to a Prior Deed" Rule and The "Of" versus The
"
tOut Of" Rule
The writer is not aware of any Texas case in which the applicabil-
ity of these rules to lease transactions has been discussed. However,
there would seem to be no reason why these rules of construction
should not also apply to language used in a lease transaction.
C. Posing The "Insuficient Fraction" Problem
Just as the proportionate reduction clause abridges the "which
fraction" problem, so also it abridges the "insufficient fraction" prob-
lem. The proportionate reduction clause explicitly sets out a formula
which determines the exact quantum of royalty reserved to a lessor
who owns but a fractional mineral interest, whatever that fraction
may be. Consequently, in lease transactions "insufficient fraction"
dissensions occur only as to interests reserved by the lessor which are
not governed by a proportionate reduction clause.
D. Solving The "Insuicient Fraction" Problem
It is now settled that the rule in the Duhig case does not apply to
mineral leases. This is the unequivocal holding of the McMahon case,
which disavowed any implication to the contrary in the earlier Gib-
son case.
The lessee in the McMahon case contended for application of the
Duhig rule to the mineral lease litigated, but the majority refused to
extend its application to the construction of oil, gas, and mineral
leases. The dominant reason given by the majority was that if the
Duhig rule were applied to mineral lease transactions, the lessee in
many instances would be thereby entitled to take all of the lessor's
fractional mineral interest without having to pay any royalty."8 Such
a result, in the majority's view, would be "unthinkable and contrary
to all modern human experience in the oil and gas industry" and
would "all too often frustrate rather than effectuate the intention of
the parties. '
Appraisal at this date of the court's decision in McMahon not
to apply the Duhig rule to mineral leases partakes of post-mortem
examination. The same factors which assure judicial adherence to the
" Such would have been the result in the McMahon case under the majority opinion if
the Duhig rule had been applied.
'7 303 S.W.2d at 346.
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Duhig rule in deed transactions equally assure adherence to the Mc-
Mahon rule in lease transactions. Courts are rightfully averse to
reversing rules of construction which affect property interests be-
cause of the reliance which may have been placed upon these rules.
Furthermore, the court's conclusion seems sound. The Duhig rule,
born of equitable considerations, should not apply in equity to min-
eral leases where its literal application would often estop the lessor
from claiming any royalty interest whatever, normal or overriding,
thus producing a result totally foreign to the very nature of oil and
gas leases.
It should be noted, however, that in neither the McMahon case nor
the Gibson case did the lessee contend that total deprivation of the
lessor's reserved interest should flow from breach of warranty. In-
stead the lessees envisaged an equitable reduction. The rule of
estoppel they sought might be stated in these terms: Where a
warranty lease purports to lease the entire mineral interest in de-
scribed land, the lessor will be estopped to assert title in the reserved
fractional mineral interest to the extent that such assertion would
exceed the proportion which the lessor's fractional mineral interest
bears to the entire mineral interest. Such a rule of estoppel closely
follows, but is not in all respects identical to, the statement of the
Duhig rule."
Admittedly, such a rule would have certain equitable appeal. But
would not its application in the Gibson case, in practical effect, rein-
state what the parties expunged-the proportionate reduction clause?
Would not its application in the McMahon case, in net result, delete
what the parties inscribed-the "without reduction" phrase? Indeed,
one might ponder whether a transaction could ever occur where the
equities favoring the use of estoppel as a vehicle for proportionate
reduction would not be offset, directly or indirectly, affirmatively
or negatively, by a proportionate reduction clause.
III. CONCLUSION
The substantive conclusions are contained in the body of this
Article, and it is unnecessary to summarize them here. It need only be
added that whenever a Texas attorney is requested to draft or ap-
prove a deed or lease for execution by the owner of a fractional
mineral interest, a "red flag" should be raised in his mind, forewarn-
ing him of the potential "which fraction" and "insufficient fraction"
80 See p. 3 3 0 supra.
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problems inherent in these transactions. With an awareness of these
problems and a mastery of the courts' solutions, the attorney may
then proceed to tailor the instrument to the particular transaction."1
" For suggested clauses see Masterson, supra note 2, at 289-90. With regard to the
"which fraction" problem in deed transactions, the writer recommends inclusion of an in-
tention clause to this effect: "It is the intention of the parties to this instrument to convey
to the grantee an undivided ( / ) of the entire mineral interest in the above
described land, which is an undivided (/) of the grantor's -
(/) of the entire mineral interest in said land." Cf. Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Harri-
son, 146 Tex. 216, 205 S.W.2d 355 (1947). Regarding the "insufficient fraction" problem
in deed transactions, if a non-Duhig rule result is desired, the writer suggests the type of
clause quoted in the text accompanying note 56 supra.
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